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Business Associations
by Paul A. Quir6s*
Lynn S. Scott**
and
James F. Brumsey***
This Article surveys noteworthy cases in the areas of corporate,
securities, partnership, and banking law decided during the survey
period' by the Georgia Supreme Court, the Georgia Court of Appeals,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and the
United States district courts located in Georgia. The Article also
summarizes recent enactments of the Georgia General Assembly with
respect to the foregoing subject matters.
I.
A.

CORPORATIONS

Piercing the CorporateVeil

Under the typical veil-piercing scenario, a third-party creditor or
claimant asks a court to set aside the legal fiction that a corporation is
its own entity, separate and distinct from its owners. Under most
circumstances the courts honor this legal fiction to preserve the
corporate form, which, in turn, generally shields investors in a corpora* Partner in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Furman University
(B.A., cum laude, 1979); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 1982).
Member, Mercer Law Review (1980-1982); Lead Articles II Editor (1981-1982). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
** Partner in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Georgia (B.S., 1971); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., magna cum
laude, 1988). Member, Mercer Law Review (1986-1988); Research Editor (1987-1988).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Wake Forest
University (B.A., 1993); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 2000). Member, Mercer Law Review (1998-2000); Senior Managing Editor (19992000). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. The survey period runs from June 1, 2002 through May 31, 2003.
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tion from liability and encourages investment and growth in business.2
However, courts in America have long since recognized that the
distinction between the corporation and its owners is not absolute. For
example, in 1905, Judge Sanborn, writing for the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, delivered what is often
regarded as the classic iteration of the corporate veil-piercing doctrine:
If any general rule can be laid down, in the present state of authority,
it is that a corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a
general rule, and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but,
when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience,
justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the
corporation as an association of persons?
Though the language used by the Georgia courts to describe the
doctrine varies to some degree from that of Judge Sanborn, the concept
is the same-if the separate personalities of the corporation and its
owner no longer exist, such that the corporation serves as the alter ego
or business conduit of its owner, then equitable principles of the law will
intervene and hold the owner liable for the debts of the corporation.4
The most interesting veil-piercing case decided by the Georgia courts
during the survey period did not concern a creditor seeking to pierce the
corporate veil in order to hold the owner liable for corporate debts; but
rather, a third-party creditor sought to pierce the corporate veil in order
to hold the corporation liable for the debts of a shareholder.' This
concept is commonly referred to as "reverse piercing of the corporate
veil."6 The reverse piercing concept is not nearly as weathered or

2. See, e.g., Hayes v. Collins, 245 Ga. App. 704, 538 S.E.2d 785 (2000).
3. United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (E.D. Wis.
1905). Georgia courts often use substantively similar phraseology in describing the
concept. See, e.g., J & J Materials, Inc. v. Conyers Seafood Co., 214 Ga. App. 63, 64-65, 446
S.E.2d 781, 782-83 (1994); Clark v. Cauthen, 239 Ga. App. 226, 227, 520 S.E.2d 477, 479
(1999); Int'l Telecomms. Exch. Corp. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1520, 1551-52
(N.D. Ga. 1995).
4. See Derbyshire v. United Builders Supplies, Inc., 194 Ga. App. 840, 844, 392 S.E.2d
37, 40 (1990).
5. Acree v. McMahan, 258 Ga. App. 433,574 S.E.2d 567 (2002), cert. granted, 2003 WL
21709627 (Ga. Feb. 25, 2003).
6. The concept of "reverse piercing" technically encompasses two distinct scenarios.
Gregory S. Crespi describes the two concepts as follows:
["Insider"] reverse piercing cases involve a dominant shareholder or other
controlling insider who attempts to have the corporate entity disregarded to avail
the insider of corporate claims against third parties or to bring corporate assets
under the shelter of protection from third party claims that are available only for
assets owned by the insider ....
["Outsider"] reverse piercing cases, however,
involve a third party claimant who files an action against the corporate insider
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heralded' as the more common version of the doctrine described above.
But the reverse piercing concept has begun to gather momentum in
certain jurisdictions,8 and, during the survey period, Georgia was no
exception.
1. Court of Appeals Upholds Jury Charge Allowing Reverse
Piercing of the Corporate Veil; Supreme Court Reverses. In
Acree v. McMahan,9 the court of appeals affirmed a jury verdict in favor
of reverse piercing of the corporate veil to hold a corporation liable for
the debts of its shareholder.10 Dr. Russell Acree was the principal
shareholder of Memorial Health Services, Inc. ("MHS"), a corporation
formed for the purpose of managing and purchasing hospitals in south
Georgia. In 1990 Acree recruited Dr. Howard McMahan and Dr. Gene
Jackson to relocate to Ocilla, Georgia, where Acree was finalizing plans
to manage the Irwin County Hospital. Acree, McMahan, and Jackson
formed a corporation, AJM, Inc., to organize the structure of their
practice, whereby Jackson and McMahan would be on the hospital's staff
and generally assist in working to turn around the hospital's finances.
Each principal was a one-third owner of AJM, Inc. They agreed that, if

and attempts to pierce the corporation to subject corporate assets to this claim;
these cases can also involve a third party claimant who attempts to assert that
claim against the corporation in an action between the corporation and the third
party.
Gregory S. Crespi, The Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appropriate Standards, 16 J.
CORP. L. 33, 37 (1990).
7. Interestingly, the first published article on the reverse piercing concept was
published by the Mercer Law Review in a student note written by W. Lawrence Fletcher.
W. Lawrence Fletcher, Note, Piercing the Corporate Veil: It Can Work in Reverse, 33
MERCER L. REv. 633 (1982). Mr. Fletcher examined the Fifth Circuit's decision in FMC
Fin. Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 424 (5th Cir. 1980), in which there was sufficient
evidence to create a jury question of whether to hold a subsidiary liable for the acts of its
parent. Mr. Fletcher concluded:
In the final analysis, the result in FMC Finance is a good one. Indeed, it
recognizes that, while the traditional corporate law concept of limited liability will
not be lightly dismissed, neither a subsidiary nor a corporation will any longer be
able to avoid liability when, due to the existence of a control relationship between
the parent and subsidiary and some type of misrepresentation, injury or injustice
results to a third party.
Fletcher, supra, at 646.
8. See, e.g., LFC Mktg. Group Inc. v. Loomis, 8 P.3d 841 (Nev. 2000) (allowing
judgment creditor to reach corporate assets controlled by judgment debtor); Shamrock Oil
& Gas Co. v. Etheridge, 159 F. Supp. 693 (D. Colo. 1958) (court reverse pierced corporation
to attach its assets to satisfy judgment against officer and shareholder of corporation).
9. 258 Ga. App. 433,574 S.E.2d 567 (2002), cert. granted,2003 WL 21709627 (Ga. Feb.
25, 2003).
10. Id. at 438, 574 S.E.2d at 572.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

the hospital was sold to AJM, Inc., McMahan and Jackson could
participate in the equity ownership of the hospital. After disagreements
arose between Acree, on one hand, and Jackson and McMahan on the
other hand, Acree agreed (in his individual capacity) to buy out the other
two for $750,000 each, to be paid in installments. For over a year, Acree
caused both MHS and the hospital to make the required payments owed
by Acree to McMahan and Jackson. Subsequently, Jackson moved away
and Acree ceased making payments to McMahan, citing unhappiness
with McMahan's continued performance under the terms of the buyout
agreement. McMahan brought suit against Acree and MHS to recover
damages for breach of contract. Following the trial, the judge instructed
the jury that even though the agreement was between McMahan and
Acree in his individual capacity, it could find MHS liable if it found
sufficient evidence to pierce the corporate veil. 1
The jury returned a verdict in favor of McMahan. Acree and MHS
appealed. On appeal Acree and MHS contended that the trial court
erred in its charge to the jury because reverse veil-piercing (which would
allow MHS to be liable for Acree's debts) is not available under Georgia
law. " Finding that McMahan presented sufficient evidence of abuse of
the corporate form to submit the veil-piercing issue to the jury," the
court of appeals turned to the issue of whether the concept of reverse
piercing is available under Georgia law.'4 The court rejected as
inconclusive two cases on which MHS relied in support of its contention
that reverse veil-piercing is unavailable in Georgia. 5 The court
declared, "[so] long as it is properly pierced under applicable law, we see
no reason why the corporate 'veil' should not be a membrane permeable
from either direction, permitting liability to move either into or out of
the corporate form, to serve the interests of justice and prevent
fraud." s The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in February
2003 to review the issue of whether reverse piercing of the corporate veil
is available under Georgia law."7

11. Id. at 433-35, 574 S.E.2d at 569-70.
12. Id. at 433, 437, 574 S.E.2d at 569, 572.
13. Id. at 436, 574 S.E.2d at 571.
14. Id. at 437, 574 S.E.2d at 572.
15. Id. at 437-38, 574 S.E.2d at 572. See Gwinnett Prop., N.V. v. G+H Montage GmbH,
215 Ga. App. 889,453 S.E.2d 52 (1994); Hogan v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 171 Ga.
App. 671, 320 S.E.2d 555 (1984). The court of appeals in Acree denied that either of these
cases was a pronouncement that reverse piercing is not available in Georgia. 258 Ga. App.
at 437-38, 574 S.E.2d at 572.
16. 258 Ga. App. at 438, 574 S.E.2d at 572.
17. Acree v. McMahan, No. S03G0500, 2003 WL 21709627 (Ga. Feb. 25, 2003).
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In a case of first impression, the supreme court reversed the court of
appeals,1 8 stating, "We reject reverse piercing, at least to the extent
that it would allow an 'outsider,' such as a third-party creditor, to pierce
the veil in order to reach a corporation's assets to satisfy claims against
an individual corporate insider." 9
Relying on the decisions and
reasoning of a number of foreign jurisdictions, 0 the court stated,
"'Reverse alter ego is an equitable doctrine; it stretches the imagination,
not to mention the equities, to conceive of how someone wholly outside
21
the corporation may be used to pierce the corporate veil from within.'"
The court continued:
"The [outsider] reverse-pierce theory presents many problems. It
bypasses normal judgment-collection procedures, whereby judgment
creditors attach the judgment debtor's shares in the corporation and
not the corporation's assets. Moreover, to the extent that the corporation has other non-culpable shareholders, they obviously will be
prejudiced if the corporation's assets can be attached directly. In
contrast, in ordinary piercing cases, only the assets of the particular
shareholder who is determined
to be the corporation's alter ego are
22
subject to attachment."
The court further reasoned that the possibility of losing out to an
individual shareholder's creditors would unsettle the expectations of the
corporation's creditors who understand their loans to be secured by
corporate assets. 2' Because the concept of disregarding the corporate
form is based on equitable principles, the court continued, "'it is
appropriately granted only in the absence of adequate remedies at
law."' 24 Finally, the court cited a case on which Acree unsuccessfully
relied at the appellate level by stating, "[a]llowing outsider reverse
piercing claims would constitute a radical change to the concept of
piercing the corporate veil in this state and, thus, should be created by
the General Assembly and not by this Court. " 2'5 Because McMahan
prevailed against Acree individually, it was not necessary to disregard

18. Acree v. McMahan, 276 Ga. 880, 585 S.E.2d 873 (2003).
19. Id. at 881, 585 S.E.2d at 874. The supreme court's opinion was delivered after the
end of the survey period, but is included in this Article for clarity.
20. See Floyd v. Internal Revenue Serv., 151 F.3d 1295, 1299-1300 (10th Cir. 1998);
Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1577 (10th Cir. 1990); Kingston
Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 1929).
21. 276 Ga. at 881, 585 S.E.2d at 874 (quoting Estate of Daily v. Title Guar. Escrow
Serv., 178 B.R. 837, 845 (D. Haw. 1995)).
22. Id. at 882, 585 S.E.2d at 874 (quoting Cascade Energy, 896 F.2d at 1577).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 883, 585 S.E.2d at 875 (quoting Floyd, 151 F.3d at 1300).
25. Id. (citing Hogan, 171 Ga. App. at 674, 320 S.E.2d at 558).
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the corporate entity for McMahan to enforce his rights under the
contract.26
2.
Court of Appeals Upholds Jury Verdict Piercing the
Corporate Veil. In a textbook piercing of the corporate veil under
Georgia law, the court of appeals affirmed a jury verdict holding an
owner personally liable for the debts of three corporations in Scott
Brothers v. Warren.27 In Scott Brothers, Danny Warren entered into an
agreement with Scott Brothers, Inc., a corporation owned by Robert and
Glenn Scott. Pursuant to the agreement, Warren would supply video
cassette and gaming machines to be rented to customers of a chain of
video rental stores owned by Scott Brothers. Unbeknownst to Warren,
a number of the machines were also in video stores owned by Scott
Development, Inc. and Scott Entertainment, Inc., both of which Glenn
Scott owned exclusively. Revenues from the rentals and any replacement costs for lost or stolen machines were to be shared equally between
Warren and Scott Brothers. After three years of regular payments, Scott
Brothers refused to make further payments. When Warren attempted
to retrieve his 544 machines, he discovered that 311 of the machines
were missing. Scott Brothers then refused to pay Warren his share of
the past due rentals and replacement costs. Warren sued Robert and
Glenn Scott and each of their companies for breach of contract.
Following a denial of defendants' motion for a directed verdict, the jury
pierced the corporate veil, finding Glenn Scott and the three companies
liable for breach of contract.28
On appeal the court reiterated the oft-cited language from Derbyshire
v. United Builders Supplies, Inc. ,29 stating that to prevail on a veilpiercing claim
"[ilt must be shown that the stockholders' disregard of the corporate
entity made it a mere instrumentality for the transaction of their own
affairs; that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personalities of the corporation and the owners no longer
exist; and to adhere to the doctrine of corporate entity would promote
injustice or protect fraud."3"

26. Id. (citing Farmers Warehouse v. Collins, 220 Ga. 141, 151, 137 S.E.2d 619, 626
(1964)).
27. 261 Ga. App. 285, 288, 582 S.E.2d 224, 227 (2003).
28. Id. at 285-86, 582 S.E.2d at 225-26.
29. 194 Ga. App. 840, 392 S.E.2d 37 (1990).
30. 261 Ga. App. at 288, 582 S.E.2d at 227 (quoting Derbyshire, 194 Ga. App. at 844,
392 S.E.2d at 40).
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Applying the test set forth in Derbyshire to the facts in Scott Brothers,
the court was persuaded by the following to uphold the veil-piercing: (1)
the corporations loaned money to Glenn Scott while they were insolvent;
(2) he continued to draw a salary from the corporations after they had
sold their assets and were insolvent; (3) he ran the three companies as
a single unit, interchanging management, bookkeeping, and trade names
for all three and not informing third parties (including Warren) that
there were three different corporate owners of the video stores; and (4)
he sold the assets of all three corporations for one lump sum, with the
proceeds of the sale going solely to him." l Based on this evidence, the
court concluded that the trial court did not err in denying Glenn Scott's
motion for directed verdict on the issue of piercing the corporate veil.32
This case exemplifies the type of facts Georgia courts are likely to find
persuasive to disregard the corporate form.
3. Summary Judgment Against Piercing the Corporate Veil
Upheld. In an apparent attempt to salvage something positive from
an investment nightmare, the original plaintiffs in Albee v. Krasnoft 3
sought relief from a fifty percent equity owner of a real estate investment company under the veil-piercing doctrine to no avail. Approximately one hundred investors, through an investment firm, contributed
significant amounts of money to Casko Investment Co., a real estate
investment company half-owned by Robert Krasnoff, only to see the
company pilfered and their money embezzled by the other fifty percent
owner, John Steven Cason Sr., to finance gambling trips on private jets
and other personal expenses. In exchange for making loans to Casko,
the investors received monthly principal and interest payments.
Although the loans were made to Casko, the entity that serviced the
loans was SGE Mortgage Finance Company, a corporation owned forty
percent by Krasnoff and sixty percent by Cason. Once it was discovered
that Cason had embezzled money from SGE, rendering it insolvent to
the investors' detriment of approximately $5 million, the investors sued
Krasnoff,34 Krasnoff's wife, and the Krasnoff Family Irrevocable Trust
on a myriad of claims. These claims included, among others, breach of
fiduciary duty, fraud, and piercing the corporate veil. Each of the claims
against Krasnoff and the others was eventually dismissed at trial.35

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 255 Ga. App. 738, 566 S.E.2d 455 (2002).
34. Note that Krasnoff himself lost over $2 million as a result of the failure of the two
entities. Id. at 739, 566 S.E.2d at 457.
35. Id., 566 S.E.2d at 457-58.
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With respect to the veil-piercing claim, the court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's grant of summary judgment.3 6 The court was persuaded
by the facts that (1) the investors' advisors knew that Casko was a shell
corporation with no assets and that SGE serviced the loan agreements,
and (2) Cason's embezzlement was the only evidence of abuse of the
corporate form.3 7 Thus, the corporate veil could not be pierced with
respect to Krasnoff.8
B.

General

1. Corporate Fiduciary of Insolvent Corporation Not Entitled
to Prefer Itself Over Other Corporate Creditors. Under Georgia
law, creditors are entitled to relief from insolvent debtors' attempts to
fraudulently transfer assets with the actual intent of defrauding or
evading creditors. 9 In Hodge v. Howes,4 Howes sued Kings Bay
Chrysler Plymouth Dodge for wrongful foreclosure, trespass, conversion,
and personal injury. Between the time of the filing of the suit and the
judgment, Hodge, the chief executive officer and sole shareholder of
Kings Bay, sold all of the assets of the corporation and caused the
proceeds to be distributed to himself. Because Kings Bay was insolvent,
Howes could not collect his $36,212 default judgment. Howes then
brought suit against Hodge personally, alleging that Hodge was liable
for the judgment previously entered against Kings Bay to the extent of
the distributions the corporation made to Hodge. The trial court granted
summary judgment to Howes on the merits and awarded damages in the
Hodge appealed, contending that summary
amount of $36,212.
judgment was improper because issues remained for the jury regarding
whether he had exercised bad faith in causing the fraudulent transfers
to be made.41
The court of appeals rejected Hodge's arguments, stating, "'Officers/directors of corporations may be held personally liable for corporate
indebtedness when they make preferential transfers of corporate assets
to themselves while the corporation is insolvent. Thus, [the court] must
determine whether the corporation was insolvent at the time the

36. Id. at 743, 566 S.E.2d at 460.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See O.C.G.A. § 9-3-35 (Supp. 2003); Uniform Fradulent Transfers Act, O.C.G.A.
§§ 18-2-70 to -80 (Supp. 2003).
40. 260 Ga. App. 107, 578 S.E.2d 904 (2003).
41. Id. at 107-08, 110, 578 S.E.2d at 905-07.
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transfers were made.'"4 2 Although the general assembly did not intend
that the taking party be liable "'solely upon the fraudulent conveyance
without proof of bad faith, actual fraud, or conspiracy,"' 4 in this case,
Hodge knew about Howes's lawsuit when he caused the conveyance of
the assets; therefore, his liability arose from his actions in bad faith and
not "solely upon the fraudulent conveyance.""
C.

Legislative Changes

1. Certificates of Authority for the Transaction of Business in
Georgia by Foreign Business Associations. The Georgia General
Assembly amended the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.")
to provide a set civil penalty of $500 for foreign corporations, limited
partnerships, and limited liability companies transacting business in the
state without a certificate of authority, as opposed to the annual penalty
of this amount previously assessed." Additionally the general assembly streamlined the application for a certificate of authority for foreign
corporations by (a) limiting the information required to be supplied
about the officers of the entity to the chief executive officer, the chief
financial officer, the secretary, and others holding similar positions (as
4
opposed to requiring such information for all directors and officers), "
and (b) removing the requirement that the foreign corporation's duration
be included on the application.4 7
2. Corrections of Documents Filed with Secretary of State. To
correct a document filed with the Secretary of State, the person seeking
correction must now describe the document being corrected in the
articles of correction, as opposed to simply attaching the defective
document to the articles of correction.8
3.
Foreign Corporation Name Registration. The general
assembly repealed the provisions of O.C.G.A. section 14-2-403 that

42. Id. at 110, 578 S.E.2d at 906 (quoting Randall & Neder Lumber Co. v. Randall, 202
Ga. App. 497, 499, 414 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1992)).

43.
S.E.2d
44.
45.

Id. at 110-11, 578 S.E.2d at 907 (quoting Kesler v. Veal, 257 Ga. 677, 678, 362
215 (1987)).
Id. at 111, 578 S.E.2d at 907.
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-122 (2003); O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1502(b); O.C.G.A. § 14-9-907(c)(2)

(2003); O.C.G.A. § 14-11-711(c)(2) (2003).
46. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1503(a)(6) (2003).
47. Id. § 14-2-1503(a)(3).

48. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-124(b)(1)(A) (2003); O.C.G.A. § 14-3-124(b)(1)(A) (2003); O.C.G.A.
§ 14-9-206.3(b)(1)(A) (2003); O.C.G.A. § 14-11-211(b)(1)(A) (2003).
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allowed foreign corporations to register their unique corporate names in
Georgia to ensure later availability (i.e., for future expansion).49
II.

SECURITIES

A. "Mere Puffery" by Officer of CorporationNot Actionable Under
Fraud or Negligent MisrepresentationTheories
In Next Century Communications Corp. v. Ellis,50 Next Century
Communications Corporation ("Next Century"), a shareholder of iXL,
filed suit against Betram Ellis, the chairman and chief executive officer
of iXL, following a sharp decline in the value of iXL's stock.'
On
appeal from the trial court's dismissal for failure to state a claim, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
dismissal.52 The court held that the complaint filed by Next Century,
alleging fraud and negligent misrepresentation, did not state claims on
which relief could be granted.5"
iXL made a public offering of seven million shares of its stock on
November 19, 1999, when Next Century was already a shareholder of
the company. In connection with this issuance, certain iXL shareholders, including Next Century, entered into a "lock up" agreement,
pursuant to which each party agreed not to sell any shares of iXL until
February 17, 2000. Four days before the expiration of the lock up
period, Ellis distributed a memorandum to the shareholders who were
parties to the lock up agreement. The memorandum encouraged them
not to sell their shares immediately upon termination of the lock up
period, stating that a large sell-off would have a negative impact on the
price of the company's stock.' Specifically, the memorandum stated:
I think our share price will start to stabilize and then rise as our
Company's strong performance continues.... I am not telling you
cannot sell any of your shares. [sic.] Instead, I am telling you that I
personally think you would be mistaken to sell any of your shares
now... If we all wait at least one more month, we could turn this
downdraft around.... I can only ask for your individual cooperation.
I cannot dictate what you can or cannot do.55

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

2002 Ga. Laws 989.
318 F.3d 1023 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1025.
Id.
Id. at 1030
Id. at 1026.
Id.
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Additionally, Ellis provided instructions for selling shares to any
shareholders desiring to do so. Next Century did not sell its shares on
or around February 17, 2000, when the shares were valued at $40 per
share. When Next Century finally sold its shares pursuant to a merger
between iXL and Scient Corporation in November 2000, the share price
had plummeted to $0.29 per share. Based on the difference in share
prices, Next Century lost a total of $27,851,601.25 by not selling
immediately upon the expiration of the lock up period. 6
To state a claim for fraud under Georgia law, the complainant must
prove the existence of five elements: "'(1) false representation by
defendant; (2) scienter; (3) intent to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain
from acting; (4) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and (5) damage to
the plaintiff. '' 5 7 Affirming the trial court's dismissal of the complaint,
the Eleventh Circuit focused on Ellis's statement, "'I think our share
price will start to stabilize and then rise as our Company's strong
performance continues.'" 5 The court concluded that the first half of
the sentence was not actionable as fraud because "it is framed as mere
opinion as to future events." 9 Regarding the second half of the
sentence, the court stated, "Ellis's characterization of iXL's performance
as 'strong' is not the sort of empirically verifiable statement that can be
affirmatively disproven, as it is inherently a label expressive of, and
generated by, opinion."" Additionally, in concluding that Next Century
could not have justifiably relied on the statements made by Ellis when
it decided not to sell its shares upon the expiration of the lock up
period,6' the court was persuaded by the fact that Next Century was a
financially sophisticated investor and that Ellis's memorandum
contained caveats that iXL's stock had been on a downward track and
procedures to sell shares if a shareholder so desired.6 2 Because the
court determined that there could not have been any justifiable reliance
by Next Century on Ellis's statements under the fraud claim, Next
Century's negligent misrepresentation claim also failed because the
"reasonable reliance" element of such a claim was not met by Next

56. Id.
57. Id.
(2002)).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.

at 1027 (quoting Ades v. Werther, 256 Ga. App. 8, 11, 567 S.E.2d 340, 343

at 1028.
at 1029.
at 1029-30.
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Century.6 3 Thus, the trial court's dismissal of the action for failure to
state a claim for which relief could be granted was proper."
B. "Ponzi Scheme" Investment Instruments Offering Fixed Rates of
Return Constitute "Securities"Under Georgia'sBlue Sky Laws
In Rasch v. State, 5 the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction of defendant Rasch on several counts of securities fraud in
connection with his operation of a "Ponzi scheme,"6 6 but it reversed the
trial court regarding certain counts of securities fraud because all of the
elements of fraud were not met.6" In Rasch the defendant/appellant
induced six individuals (the "Investors") to entrust him with various
sums ranging from $10,000 to $158,640. In exchange, Rasch agreed to
repay their principal plus various percentage-based rates of return. In
some (but not all) of the cases, the evidence showed that Rasch promised
to "invest" the victims' funds in various schemes on behalf of the
Investors. In each case, Rasch used the money entrusted to him to pay
his personal expenses or to pay other Investors who were owed payments
under their respective agreements with Rasch. The facts with respect
to each Investor varied to some degree regarding the names of the
instrument executed by the Investor, the promised percentage returns
on principal, and the nature of the "investments" themselves. At trial,
the jury found Rasch guilty of securities fraud under O.C.G.A. section
10-5-12(a)(2)6" for his actions with respect to all of the Investors.69
After first determining that the arrangements entered into with Rasch
constituted securities under Georgia's version of the "Howey Test,"7 ° the

63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 1030.
Id.
260 Ga. App. 379, 579 S.E.2d 817 (2003).
Id. at 388, 579 S.E.2d at 824. The court described "Ponzi schemes" as follows:
"The term '[P]onzi scheme' refers to an investment scheme whereby returns to
investors are financed, not through the success of an underlying business venture,
but from the principal sums of newly attracted investors. Typically, investors are
promised large returns for their investments. Initial investors are actually paid
the promised returns, attracting additional investors."
Id. at 379 n.1, 579 S.E.2d at 818 n.1 (quoting In re Primeline Securities Corp., 295 F.3d
1100, 1104 n.2 (10th Cir. 2002)).
67. Id. at 388, 579 S.E.2d at 824.
68. O.C.G.A. § 10-15-12(a)(2) (2000 & Supp. 2003). This section provides in pertinent
part that it is unlawful for a person "(2) [iun connection with an offer to sell, sale, offer to
purchase, or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly: (A) to employ a device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud." Id.
69. 260 Ga. App. at 379-83, 579 S.E.2d at 818-21.
70. Id. at 384, 579 S.E.2d at 821-22. The "Howey Test," as adopted by the Georgia
courts, provides that "an instrument is a security if it is (1) 'an investment in a common
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67

court turned to whether there was sufficient evidence to support the
jury's conviction of Rasch on the numerous counts of securities fraud."
Though the court affirmed the jury's convictions on several of the
securities fraud counts, it reversed the counts for which there was
insufficient evidence.72 Because the indictment charged that Rasch
committed securities fraud by selling securities "'upon the representation
that said money would be invested on [the victims'] behalf, which
representation was untrue and which constituted a device, scheme, and
artifice to defraud,'"" an essential element of the fraud claims was
lacking when no evidence existed
that Rasch actually promised to invest
74
the monies for the victims.

C. Variable Life Insurance Policy is a "Covered Security" Under
Securities Litigation Uniform StandardsAct
In Herndon v. Equitable Variable Life Insurance Co.," the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a class action for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. 76 The court held that the
variable life insurance policy at issue constituted a "covered security"
under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
("SLUSA"), thereby requiring preemption by federal law.77 In a case
of first impression, the court determined that even though the variable
annuity at issue contained a life insurance component (which was
lacking in previous cases decided by federal courts)," the policy was a
"covered security," thereby bringing any claim of fraud in connection
therewith under the purview of SLUSA. 9 Because the fraud and other
claims brought by the insured were couched in terms of state law rather

venture'; (2) 'premised on a reasonable expectation of profits'; [and] (3) 'to be derived from
the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.'" Id., 579 S.E.2d at 821 (quoting Tech
Res., Inc. v. Estate of Hubbard, 246 Ga. 583, 584, 272 S.E.2d 314, 316 (1980)). See SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
71. 260 Ga. App. at 388, 579 S.E.2d at 824.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 387, 579 S.E.2d at 823.
74. Id. at 388, 579 S.E.2d at 824.
75. 325 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2003).
76. Id. at 1255.
77. Id. at 1254; 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(p)(c), 78bb(f) (2000), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367, 1441,
1446 (2000).
78. 325 F.3d at 1254 (citing Dudek v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 295 F.3d 875, 878 (8th Cir.
2002); Patenaude v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 290 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2002);
Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2001)).
79. Id.
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than federal law, as required by SLUSA, the trial court properly
dismissed the claims with prejudice.8 0
D.

Legislative Changes

The general assembly amended Georgia's "blue sky" law to include
viatical investments in its definition of "security;"8 ' however, it
specifically exempted such investments from the registration requirements of O.C.G.A. section 10-5-5.2 A "viatical investment" is defined
as "the contractual right to receive any portion of the death benefit or
ownership of a life insurance policy or certificate for consideration that
is less than the expected death benefit of the life insurance policy or
certificate."" Additionally, the general assembly made it unlawful to
sell or offer for sale any viatical investment without first filing a
statement with the state's commissioner of securities containing a full
description of the viatical investment in accordance with O.C.G.A.
section 10-5-12(q).8'
III.
A.

PARTNERSHIPS

Formation

Whereas corporations and other legal entities are formed upon a
definitive act such as the filing of articles of incorporation or articles of
organization with the Secretary of State in the jurisdiction of formation,
the question of whether a partnership has been formed can present a
difficult question of fact. For example, a partnership can arise from the
relationship of two parties and their actions with respect to one another,

80. Id. at 1255.
81. O.C.G.A. § 10-5-2(a)(26) (2000 & Supp. 2003).
82. O.C.G.A. § 10-5-8(12) (Supp. 2003).
83. O.C.G.A. § 10-5-2(a)(32) (Supp. 2003). This section also lists certain transactions
that are explicitly excepted from the definition of "viatical investments" as follows: (a) the
sale or transfer of a death benefit or life insurance policy to a "viatical issuer" (as defined
therein); (b) the assignment of a life insurance policy to a lender as collateral for a loan;
(c) the obtaining of accelerated benefits from the issuer pursuant to a life insurance policy
issued under the laws of Georgia or another state, and
([d]) the sale or transfer of any portion of the death benefit or ownership of a life
insurance policy by an individual who enters into no more than one agreement in
a calendar year regarding the transfer of life insurance policies insuring the life
of only one person for consideration that is less than the death benefit, unless any
third party receives, directly or indirectly, any fee, commission, or other
remuneration in connection with said agreement.
Id. §§ 10-5-2(a)(32)(A) to (D).
84. O.C.G.A. § 10-5-12(q) (Supp. 2003).
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regardless of whether the parties ever intended to form a "partnership."
Therefore, determining whether a partnership has been formed often
involves a highly probative review of the facts surrounding the parties'
relationship. Such was the case in Jerry Dickerson Presents, Inc. v.
8 5
Concert/Southern Chastain Promotions,
a fact-intensive partnership
case decided by the court of appeals.
Jerry Dickerson Presents, Inc. ("Dickerson"), a former co-promoter of
concerts featured at Chastain Park in Atlanta, filed suit against its
former "partners," alleging trespass/taking of property, breach of contract
with respect to multiple agreements, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of
contractual expectation, tortious interference with contract, and "aiding
and abetting breach of fiduciary duty."8 8 Affirming the trial court's
grant of summary judgment to defendants on all claims,87 the court of
appeals held that the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, did not present a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether a partnership existed between the parties.8"
Chastain Ventures ("Ventures") was formed in 1990 as a joint venture
between Concert/Southern Chastain Promotions ("C/S") and Robert W.
Woodruff Arts Center d/b/a Atlanta Symphony Orchestra ("Symphony")
for the purpose of entering into a lease with the City of Atlanta for
facilities comprising Chastain Park Amphitheater ("Chastain"). To
secure the lease, Ventures sought to meet Atlanta's Minority Business
Enterprise ("MBE") requirements by agreeing, in the lease with the City
of Atlanta, to endeavor to sublease thirty-five percent of the available
concert dates to qualified MBE promoters.8 9
Once the parties entered into the lease, Ventures entered into a
sublease with Dickerson pursuant to which Dickerson had the right to
sublet from C/S thirteen event dates at Chastain (the "Dickerson
Dates"). Alternatively, the sublease provided that Dickerson had the
right to "co-promote" the Dickerson Dates with C/S exclusively. The
sublease also contained a reciprocal nontransfer provision and specifically disclaimed the creation of a joint venture between Ventures and
Dickerson.
Contemporaneously with entering into the sublease,
Dickerson and C/S entered into a Promotion and Consulting Agreement
(the "PC Agreement"), pursuant to which C/S would sublet all of the
Dickerson Dates from Dickerson in exchange for thirty-five percent of
the net profits up to an annual total of $70,000. The terms of the PC

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

260 Ga. App. 316, 579 S.E.2d 761 (2003).
Id. at 316, 321, 579 S.E.2d at 763, 766-67.
Id. at 329, 579 S.E.2d at 772.
Id. at 322, 325, 579 S.E.2d at 767, 769-70.
Id. at 316-17, 579 S.E.2d at 763-64.
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Agreement also provided as follows: (a) Dickerson would assist in the copromotion and production of concerts; (b) C/S would be the managing
promoter of all events and would have to approve all of Dickerson's copromotion actions; (c) C/S would be entitled to all revenues generated
from the Dickerson Dates above the $70,000 fee; (d) all expenses, losses
and debts incurred would be C/S's responsibility and were to be
subtracted from revenues; and (e) neither party would be liable for the
debts or obligations of the other. The PC Agreement also stated that no
joint venture was to be created or implied thereby. The parties operated
in accordance with the terms of the agreements for the majority of the
term of Venture's lease with the City of Atlanta, with C/S co-promoting
each of the Dickerson Dates in accordance with the terms described
above.9" During this time, Dickerson repeatedly held himself out to the
City of Atlanta's Office of Contract Compliance (the authority responsible for monitoring MBE Compliance) as a joint venture partner of
Ventures, pursuant to which Dickerson "share[d] profits or losses on a
65-35 basis" with Ventures. 9'
In March 1998, the three principal shareholders of the two partner
corporations holding the joint venture interests in C/S sold one hundred
percent of their interests in such corporations for approximately $16
million. The sale included the two partner corporations' joint venture
interests in C/S and C/S's joint venture interest with Symphony in
Ventures. Approximately one year later, Dickerson demanded $2.625
million, representing his thirty-five percent share of $7.5 million
presumed sale proceeds. Dickerson contended that a partnership arose
from the City of Atlanta's ordinance requiring thirty-five percent
minority participation and that the sale of the businesses effectively
dissolved the partnership without making any distributions to Dickerson. However, the parties continued their relationship through the
expiration of the lease, and Dickerson continued receiving payments
from C/S as he had in the past. In 1999 Ventures began negotiating
terms for a new ten-year lease with the City of Atlanta, at which point
Dickerson demanded one hundred percent of the profits generated by
concerts produced by C/S on the Dickerson Dates. When the city agreed
to renew the lease with Ventures, C/S and Ventures agreed to look for
a different minority-owned business to fulfill the City of Atlanta's MBE
requirements.92
In trying to persuade the court that a partnership existed, Dickerson
relied principally, if unsoundly, on a number of documents, several of

90. Id. at 317-19, 579 S.E.2d at 765.
91. Id. at 319, 579 S.E.2d at 765.
92. Id. at 319-20, 579 S.E.2d at 765-66.
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which were prepared by Dickerson himself, that referred to Dickerson as
a "joint venture partner" or "minority partner," or that "identifie[d] the
name of the partnership as 'Chastain Ventures/Jerry Dickerson Presents,
Inc.'"9 3 Judge Eldridge, clearly unimpressed by Dickerson's arguments,
pointed out that to find this "evidence" of a "partnership," Dickerson had
to sift through over seven thousand pages of transcript. 94
Turning to the merits of Dickerson's partnership claims, the court first
pointed out that the use of the label, "joint venture partner" or "minority
partner" does not demonstrate a legal partnership in and of itself.9 5
Furthermore, the court stated that the question of whether a partner in
a joint venture is a legal partner is a question of fact9" and "'depends
on the rights and responsibilities assumed by the joint venturers.'""
Citing Aaron Rents, Inc. v. Fourteenth Street Venture, L.P,9 the court
set forth the following factors that could indicate the existence of a
partnership: (a) common enterprise, (b) the sharing of risk, (c) the
sharing of expenses, (d) the sharing of profits and losses, (e) a joint right
of control over the business, and () a joint ownership of capital. 9
With respect to Dickerson's claimed partnership with Ventures, the
court noted that, of the three agreements at issue, the only agreement
between Dickerson and Ventures was the sublease. ° ° Under the
sublease, Dickerson had the right to lease thirty-five percent of the nonSymphony Chastain events at the same rental rate Ventures would
charge any other lessee.10 ' Furthermore, Ventures did not share in the
profits, losses, or liability incurred in connection with Dickerson's use of
the Dickerson Dates.0 2 The court concluded that the sublease "does
not in any fashion reflect an intent between Ventures and Dickerson to
form a mutual legal 'entity.'"' " 3 Finally, with respect to Ventures, the
court determined that the sublease did not show evidence of a joint
venture, much less a partnership." 4

93. Id. at 322, 579 S.E.2d at 767.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 322-23, 579 S.E.2d at 768.
96. Id. at 323, 579 S.E.2d at 768.
97. Id. (quoting Accolades Apartments v. Fulton County, 274 Ga. 28, 30, 549 S.E.2d
348, 351 (2001)).
98. 243 Ga. App. 746, 533 S.E.2d 759 (2000).
99. 260 Ga. App. at 323, 579 S.E.2d at 768 (quoting Aaron Rents, 243 Ga. App. at 747,
533 S.E.2d at 761).
100. Id. at 324, 579 S.E.2d at 768.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing Accolades Apartments, 274 Ga. at 29-30, 549 S.E.2d at 349-50).
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For similar reasons, the court reached the same conclusion regarding
the relationship between Dickerson and C/S.0 5 The only agreement
entered into between C/S and Dickerson was the PC Agreement.' °6
Recognizing that there was no evidence of a partnership between the
parties thereto, °7 the court found the following factors persuasive: (a)
if C/S exercised its option to sublease the Dickerson Dates from
Dickerson pursuant to the terms of the sublease, it did so with complete
responsibility for all loss associated with producing the events on those
dates; (b) a maximum annual amount of $70,000 was to be paid to
Dickerson, regardless of total net profits; and (c) C/S was the managing
promoter and possessed all rights to direct and control Dickerson's
promotional efforts.'0 8 According to the court, "[t]his is hardly the
'equal right' to direct and control the promotion of the event dates
reflective of a partnership or joint venture."' ° Finally, after explaining that an MBE "Joint Venture Affidavit" filled out by Dickerson did
not sufficiently create a joint venture or partnership, the court concluded
its partnership discussion by referring to an April 27, 2000 letter written
by Dickerson in which he stated, "[tlhere is no partnership in existence
between [Dickerson] pertaining to Chastain or any of its operations.""0
The court agreed with Dickerson's own assessment."'
B.

Foreclosure Sale of Limited Partner'sPartnershipInterest

Georgia statutory law provides that a limited partner's interest in a
limited partnership is personal property."2 It should be no surprise
that Georgia law further provides that a judgment creditor of a limited
partner may apply to the court to charge the partnership interest of the
indebted limited partner with payment of the unsatisfied part of the
judgment debt, appoint receivers, or take such other actions as the court
may deem necessary to satisfy the judgment."3
In Stewart v. Lanier Park Medical Office Building, Ltd.,"a the court
of appeals affirmed the trial court's order of foreclosure by judicial sale
of a limited partner's partnership interest to satisfy the limited partner's

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id., 579 S.E.2d at 769.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 324-25, 579 S.E.2d at 769.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 14-9A-49 (2003).
See O.C.G.A. § 14-9A-52 (2003).
259 Ga. App. 898, 578 S.E.2d 572 (2003).
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judgment debt to the partnership.1 1
Lanier Park Medical Office
Building, Ltd. ("Lanier Park"), a limited partnership, filed suit against
one of its limited partners, Stewart, to recover arrearages for rent and
operating expenses owed pursuant to the partnership agreement. The
jury awarded the limited partnership $172,794 plus interest for the
arrearages, plus $20,150 for attorney fees and litigation costs for bad
faith and stubborn litigiousness. When Stewart failed to pay the
judgment, the limited partnership moved for a forfeiture of Stewart's
partnership interest, and the court issued a writ of fieri facias ("fi fa").
Lanier Park then applied for, and the court issued, an order charging
Stewart's partnership interest to satisfy the unpaid judgment.
Additionally, the court ordered that Stewart's partnership interest11 6be
foreclosed upon by judicial sale. Stewart appealed from this order.
Affirming the trial court's order of judicial sale, the court of appeals
117
held that the broad language of O.C.G.A. section 14-9A-52(a)
authorizes a trial court to order foreclosure by judicial sale of a limited
partner's charged interest in certain circumstances.1 8 Furthermore,
the court stated that "[]udicial sale may be appropriate where, for
instance, it is apparent that distributions under the charging order will
not pay the judgment debt within a reasonable amount of time." 9
Because issues regarding the final accounting and distribution of
partnership assets could not be decided until Stewart paid his debt to
the partnership, and the trial court determined that foreclosure was the
only reasonable means of getting the debt paid, the court of appeals
found no abuse of the trial court's discretion under O.C.G.A. section 149A-52. 2 °

115. Id. at 901, 578 S.E.2d at 575.
116. Id. at 898-99, 578 S.E.2d at 573-74.
117. O.C.G.A. § 14-9A-52(a). This subsection provides in full:
On due application to a court of competent jurisdiction by any judgment creditor
of a limited partner, the court may charge the interest of the indebted limited
partner with payment of the unsatisfied amount of the judgment debt and may
appoint a receiver and make all other orders,directions, and inquiries which the
circumstances of the case may require.
Id. (emphasis added).
118. 259 Ga. App. at 900, 578 S.E.2d at 574 (citing Nigri v. Lotz, 216 Ga. App. 204,
205, 453 S.E.2d 780, 781 (1995)).
119. Id. (citing Nigri, 216 Ga. App. at 205, 453 S.E.2d at 781).
120. Id., 578 S.E.2d at 575.
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Relationship of Partnersto General Partnership

In Southcom Group, Inc. v. Plath,"2' the court of appeals reversed
the trial court and held that an application for confirmation of an
arbitration award, which named the partners of the losing partnership
in the arbitration as party-defendants was sufficient to state a cause of
action against the party-defendants even though they were not named
in the arbitration award.12 2 In Southcom Group, one of the parties to
a marketing agreement, Southcom Group, Inc. ("Southcom"), obtained an
arbitration award for breach of contract against Prolific Plastics, a
general partnership composed of three partners.
However, in its
application to the Superior Court of Fayette County for confirmation of
the arbitration award, Southcom named the three partners as partydefendants (rather than Prolific) in the caption of the application. The
trial court dismissed the confirmation application for failure to state a
claim for which relief may be granted against the three partners, and
Southcom amended its application by adding a complaint against the
Prolific Plastics partners individually. The trial court again dismissed
the confirmation application for failure to state a claim against the

partners. 1z3
In reversing the trial court, the court of appeals agreed with Southcom's contention that the application for confirmation sufficiently stated
a cause of action against the three partners in their capacities as
partners of Prolific Plastics. 24 The court explained the relevant
common law principles as follows: "In Georgia, '[j]udgments may be
entered and executed against partnerships, and service of process on one
or more of the partners will authorize a judgment against the partnership binding all firm assets, and individually binding the property of the
partners who are served.'' 25 The court explained that, except in
certain circumstances, all partners are jointly and severally liable for the
debts and obligations of a general partnership. 1 2
The court then
explained that a partnership is not an entirely separate legal entity from
its owners, "[r]ather, it is but 'somewhat so; the partners, as to

121. 257 Ga. App. 46, 570 S.E.2d 341 (2002).
122. Id. at 47, 570 S.E.2d at 342.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 47-48, 570 S.E.2d at 342 (quoting Atlanta Warehouses, Inc. v. Housing Auth.
of Atlanta, 143 Ga. App. 588, 594, 239 S.E.2d 387, 393 (1977); citing Newton, Inc. v. Alex,
162 Ga. App. 664, 292 S.E.2d 121 (1982); Higdon v. Williamson, 10 Ga. App. 376, 73 S.E.
528 (1912)).
126. Id. at 48, 570 S.E.2d at 342 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 14-8-15(a) (2003)).
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partnership debts, are joint contractors; and each is the agent of the
other to a limited extent. When suit is brought for a debt due by the
partnership, the plaintiff may hold the individual partners liable by
serving them.""27
D.

Legislative Changes

The general assembly expanded O.C.G.A. section 14-9-104(b) to add
professional corporations and limited liability companies (domestic and
qualified foreign) to the list of entities that may serve as registered
agents of limited partnerships. 2 '
IV.
A.

BANKING

Foreclosure on Guarantor'sInterest in Limited Liability Company

In Hopson v. Bank of North Georgia,'2 9 the court of appeals held that
a bank was entitled to foreclose on a loan guarantor's interest in a
limited liability company ("LLC") even though the collateral at issue was
only an economic interest as opposed to an entire membership interest
in the LLC."' The Bank of North Georgia loaned an initial amount
of $300,000 to RCI Housing Partners I ("RC"), a Georgia LLC in which
Hopson was a member. As a condition to the loan, the bank required
Hopson to personally guarantee the loan and assign as security all of his
right, title, and interest as a member in Nine Arbor Partners ("NAP"),
another Georgia LLC. The bank made additional loans to Hopson and
Ronald Curry, the other member of RCI, in the amounts of $732,000 and
$275,000, each of which were secured by Hopson's interest in RCI. RCI
defaulted on the loans, and the bank sought to foreclose on Hopson's
interest in NAP. The trial court granted the bank's petition to foreclose,
and Hopson appealed.' 3'
Hopson's principal argument on appeal was that NAP's operating
agreement precluded the bank from taking a security interest in his LLC
membership interest because the operating agreement provided that an
interest in the LLC could not be transferred without the prior written

127. Id., 570 S.E.2d at 342-43 (quoting Atlanta Warehouses, 143 Ga. App. at 594, 239
S.E.2d at 393).
128. O.C.G.A. § 14-9-104(b) (2003).
129. 258 Ga. App. 360, 574 S.E.2d 411 (2002).
130. Id. at 362-63, 574 S.E.2d at 413.
131. Id. at 360-61, 574 S.E.2d at 412.
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consent of all of its members (which the bank did not obtain). 13 2
Specifically, the NAP operating agreement provided:
11.01 General. Except as otherwise specifically provided herein,
neither a Member nor an Economic Interest Owner shall have the right
to: a) sell, assign, pledge, hypothecate, transfer, exchange or otherwise
transfer for consideration (collectively, "Sale").... 11.02 Transferee
Not Member in Absence of Unanimous Consent. (a) Notwithstanding
anything contained herein to the contrary, if all of the remaining
Members do not approve by unanimous written consent [the proposed
sale of the membership interest or economic interest], then the
proposed transferee or donee shall have no right to participate in the
management of the business and affairs of the Company or to become
a Member. The transferee shall be merely an Economic Interest
Owner. 133
As the court pointed out, however, nothing in the above language
prevented a member from transferring his interest without consent;
rather, it specifically contemplated the transfer of a purely economic
interest without consent."
Furthermore, the court held that because
the parties attached the operating agreement and expressly made it a
part of the security agreements executed by Hopson, the two agreements
had to be interpreted in conjunction with each other. 135 As a result,
the court determined that the bank took a purely economic interest in
NAP in accordance with the terms of the operating agreement. 136 The
court concluded that foreclosure on an "economic interest" in an LLC was
in accordance with the provisions of the Georgia Limited Liability
Company Act.137
B.

ProperPayment of Construction Loan Draws

The question for the court of appeals in Mustaqeem-Graydon v.
SunTrust Bank... was whether the bank's payments to a contractor
were properly made under the terms of the lender's construction loan to
the owner of a music conservatory. In this case, the lender committed
to loan Mustaqeem-Graydon ("Graydon") $310,000 to finance the

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
(2003)).
138.

Id. at 361, 574 S.E.2d at 412.
Id.
Id. at 362, 574 S.E.2d at 413.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 362-63, 574 S.E.2d at 413 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 14-11-101(13), -502, -503, -601
258 Ga. App. 200, 572 S.E.2d 455 (2002).
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purchase and renovation of an older building located in Albany,
Georgia. 1 9 The draw note signed by Graydon provided that "disbursements will be made at the sole discretion or the Lender unless the
Lender has otherwise specifically made a legally binding commitment to
make disbursements hereunder."1 ° The conservatory guaranteed the
loan to Graydon. Following an initial draw on the loan account for the
final payment of the acquisition price, a draw in the amount of $36,000
was made on the note and placed in Graydon's checking account to cover
the contractor's first renovation bill in the amount of $35,635. Graydon
testified that he had discussed his dissatisfaction with the contractor's
work at this point and that the bank informed him that if he did not
pay, the contractor could walk off the job. Graydon wrote a check from
a different account for the full amount of the bill, but the check bounced.
Graydon then paid the contractor $30,000 via a cashier's check from the
other account. Not surprisingly, the contractor contacted the lender's
loan officer to discuss setting up a more secure form of payment. The
loan officer replied that Graydon would have to authorize any such
arrangement. Afterwards, Graydon wrote a number of memos to the
bank and the contractor, seemingly authorizing the bank to issue funds
directly to thc contractor, so the bank transferred the funds to the
contractor's account. Eventually, the contractor submitted its third
renovation bill, which exceeded the balance left on the construction draw
note. A few weeks later, Graydon sent a memo to the lender expressing
his intent to pay the amounts owing on the loan and asking for a
temporary forbearance of collections on the matured note. Graydon had
not paid any principal or interest due on the note. Additionally,
Graydon's checking account at SunTrust was overdrawn by approximately $6000. The bank sent Graydon and the conservatory a notice of
default and informed them that it would be seeking fifteen percent
attorney fees if the balance remained unpaid. Graydon sued SunTrust
and its parent company for breach of contract, negligent distribution of
loan proceeds, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and conspiracy. The
trial court granted summary judgment to SunTrust on all claims.'
First, the court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment to
SunTrust Banks, Inc., the lender's parent corporation, because it was not

139. Id. at 202, 572 S.E.2d at 458. The total cost of the acquisition of the property and
the renovations was approximately $540,000. Graydon obtained a loan from the City of
Albany for $200,000 and planned to raise the additional $30,000 to $40,000 in order to

meet his contractual obligations with the contractor. Id.
140. Id.
141.

Id. at 201-04, 207, 572 S.E.2d at 457-59, 461.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

a party to any of the transactions.142 Next, with respect to Graydon's
claim that the last two disbursements to the contractor were made
without his consent, the court held that there was no genuine issue of
material fact because Graydon did not contest that he sent the memos
authorizing the bank to disburse funds to the contractor at its discretion. 14 3 Furthermore, the court determined that the loan agreement
unambiguously provided that disbursements would be made at the
lender's sole discretion unless the lender had otherwise made a legally
binding written commitment to make disbursements.'"
Next, the
court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on Graydon's
claim of negligent inspection by the lender.4 5 Because nothing in the
record indicated that the bank undertook the inspection of the property
on Graydon's behalf, summary judgment was proper.'46 Additionally,
the court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on
Graydon's fraud claim (and consequently, the conspiracy to commit fraud
claim) regarding the second draw of $26,012.50 because Graydon
authorized in writing the bank's fulfillment of the contractor's draw
requests by electronic funds transfer.'4 7 Based on the above reasoning,
the court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of the lender. 4 '
C. Disbursement of Proceeds of Certificateof Deposit "Upon Proper
Request"
In South v. Bank of America, 49 the court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's grant of summary judgment to the bank, which upon a
telephonic request by one of the owners of a certificate of deposit ("CD")
disbursed the proceeds of the jointly owned CD to the detriment of the
other owner. 5 ° The more avid and attentive readers of the Mercer
Law Review may recall the underlying facts of the case from two years
ago 5' as follows:

142. Id. at 205, 572 S.E.2d at 460.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 206, 572 S.E.2d at 460.
145. Id.
146. Id., 572 S.E.2d at 461.
147. Id. at 206-07, 572 S.E.2d at 461.
148. Id. at 207, 572 S.E.2d at 461.
149. 260 Ga. App. 91, 579 S.E.2d 80 (2003).
150. Id. at 96, 579 S.E.2d at 83.
151. See Paul A. Quir6s, Lynn S. Scott & James F. Brumsey, Business Associations,53
MERCER L. REV. 109 (2001).
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Louise South purchased an eighteen-month CD from NationsBank for
$40,000 in April 1993 in the names of both herself and her son, Harry
South, without informing Harry that she had made him a joint owner
of the CD. Louise redeemed the CD for its matured value in October
1994 by making a telephone request to the bank, and the bank
deposited the proceeds from the CD into Louise's bank account.
Following her death in 1999, Harry learned of the above transactions
and filed suit against NationsBank's successor, Bank of America,
alleging that by negotiating the original CD without his knowledge or
consent, the bank violated his ownership rights, converted the proceeds
of the CD, and breached its contract.'52
In the original case before the court of appeals, the court reversed the
trial court's grant of judgment on the pleadings for the bank because a
question of fact existed as to whether the proceeds of the CD were issued
pursuant to a "proper request" as defined by O.C.G.A. section 7-1Following the previous appeal, the parties submitted
810(12).15
additional evidence, and the trial court granted the bank's motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that Louise South made a proper
request to negotiate the certificate. Harry South appealed."M
On appeal, South first contended that an issue of material fact existed
as to whether Louise actually made the telephone request. However, the
bank offered direct testimonial evidence of an employee, Connelly, who
stated that she had received and processed Louise's telephonic request
to negotiate the CD. Additionally, Connelly filled out several withdrawal, redemption, and new account slips as well as other transaction
confirmation forms, which were all entered into evidence. Connelly
testified that she completed several other transactions for Louise before
her death, all in accordance with the bank's policies allowing such
transactions. South contended that the following three facts constituted
direct evidence that his mother did not authorize the negotiation of the
CD: (a) the bank did not produce any written policies and procedures
relevant to the transaction; (b) the bank did not produce a depositor's
agreement for the CD account opened by Louise following the redemption of the CD at issue; and (c) Louise signed no document authorizing
the redemption of the CD.' 55 South also offered circumstantial evidence that "his mother 'would never conduct bank transactions over the
phone, '""5' and that he suspected that his sister may have placed the

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 143.
260 Ga. App. at 92, 579 S.E.2d at 81; O.C.G.A. § 7-1-810(12) (1997).
260 Ga. App. at 92, 579 S.E.2d at 81.
Id. at 93-94, 579 S.E.2d at 81-82.
Id.
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authorizing call and taken the proceeds. 57 The court dismissed this
"evidence" on the grounds that it was irrelevant because it merely
showed that the bank's procedures may not have been precisely followed,
or that it was otherwise circumstantial. 55 Because "'circumstantial
evidence has no probative value against positive and uncontradicted
evidence that no such fact exists, provided that the circumstantial
evidence may be construed consistently with the direct evidence,'"'5 9
the court held that summary judgment was appropriate.' 6
Finally, South contended that an issue of fact existed concerning
whether his mother made a "proper request for withdrawal" under
O.C.G.A. section 7-1-810(12)161 because Connelly admitted that she did
not obtain a withdrawal confirmation signed by Louise South in
accordance with bank policy, nor did she personally document the
telephonic transaction.1 62 However, as the court pointed out, South
confused the "request for payment with the bank's need to document the
Thus, South's contention was
request for payment after the fact.""
without merit."6

D. Preemption of Georgia Law by Federal Law Allowing Banks to
Charge Fees to Non-Accountholders for Check-CashingServices
6 5 Bank of America filed suit
In Bank of America, N.A. v. Sorrell,"
against the Georgia Department of Banking and Finance, challenging
state laws prohibiting Georgia banks from charging check-cashing fees
The relevant provisions of Georgia law
to non-accountholders.'"
provide as follow:
"No financial institution, savings bank, national bank, or state or
federal credit union or savings and loan association may charge any fee
of any kind to a person or corporation who does not have an account
with that institution for cashing a check or other instrument which is
payable to such person or corporation and is drawn on the account of
another person or corporation with that institution."167

157. Id.
158. Id. at 94-95, 579 S.E.2d at 82-83.
159. Id. at 94, 579 S.E.2d at 82 (quoting Lane v. Spragg, 224 Ga. App. 606, 607-08, 481
S.E.2d 592, 594 (1997)).
160. Id. at 96, 579 S.E.2d at 83.
161. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-810(12) (1997).
162. 260 Ga. App. at 95, 579 S.E.2d at 83.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 248 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (N.D. Ga. 2002).
166. Id. at 1198.
167. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A § 7-1-239.5 (1997)).
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Additionally, O.C.G.A. section 7-1-372168 provides that a "commercial
bank shall pay all checks drawn on it at par and shall make no charge
for the payment of such checks."'6 9 As the court pointed out, these two
provisions, taken together, prevent banks in Georgia from charging a
check-cashing fee to non-accountholders. 7 °
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("0CC"), the federal
agency within the Treasury Department responsible for administering
the National Bank Act, filed an amicus curiae brief supporting Bank of
America. 17'
Additionally, in a previous opinion letter to Bank of
America, the OCC informed Bank of America that it was authorized
"under 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) and 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002(a), to charge the
non-relationship customer check cashing convenience fee." 172 Showing
deference to the OCC as an agency interpreting a law under which it
acts (especially when it interprets its own regulations), 173 the court
concluded that "[the] federal banking law permits banks to charge fees
to non-accountholders for cashing checks drawn on that bank." 74 As
such, the National Bank Act directly conflicted with the Georgia
statutes, so there was no issue of fact that would preclude summary
judgment. 175 Additionally, because Bank of America succeeded on the
merits and had testified that "it loses hundreds of thousands of dollars
of revenue each month"'76 as a result of not charging non-accountholders for check-cashing services, the court permanently enjoined the
Georgia Department of Banking and Finance from enforcing the Georgia

laws. 177
E.

Legislative Changes

1. Objectives for Entities Under Supervision of Department of
Banking and Finance that are not Financial Institutions. The
general assembly amended O.C.G.A. section 7-1-3(a)(10) 178 to provide
objectives for the supervision of nonfinancial institutions such as check

168. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-372 (1997).
169. Id.
170. 248 F. Supp. 2d at 1198.
171. Id. at 1199.
172. Id.
173. Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231 n.13 (2001)).
174. Id. (citing Wells Fargo Bank Texas, N.A. v. James, 184 F. Supp. 2d 588, 590-91
(W.D. Tex. 2001)).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1200.
178. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-3(a)(10) (1997 & Supp. 2003).
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cashers, mortgage lenders, and brokers by the Department of Banking
and Finance (the "Department").17 9 Such objectives include: (a) the
supervision and examination of their business affairs to ensure they are
operating in accordance with Georgia law; 80° (b) the protection of
consumer interests and service by these entities;"" and (c) the simplification and modernization of the law governing such entities and the
delegation of8 rulemaking
power and administrative discretion to the
2
Department. 1

2. Restrictions on Commissioner, Deputy Commissioners, and
Examiners. The general assembly expanded the scope of Department
employees covered by O.C.G.A. section 7-1-37(a) 8 3 (relating to receipt
of gifts, money, and property from financial institutions) to cover any
Department employee with financial institution or licensee supervisory
responsibilities."
This section was also expanded so that covered
Department employees may not give any money or property as a gift to
any financial institution (or its directors, officers, agents, employees,
attorneys, or subsidiaries) unless the gift is consistent with the state's
ethics in government policy.8 5
The commissioner, a deputy commissioner, a Department employee
with financial institution or licensee supervisory responsibilities, or an
examiner may be permitted to own securities of a financial institution
under any of the following circumstances: (a) "if the security was
obtained prior to commencement of employment with the [D]epartment;"8 6 (b) "if the ownership ... was acquired through inheritance;

gift; stock split or dividend; merger, acquisition, or other change in
corporate structure;"8 7 or otherwise without intent of such employee
to acquire the interest; 8 or (c) if the security is part of an investment
fund, provided that a thirty percent threshold of funds invested in the
securities of one or more FDIC-insured depository institutions is not
exceeded.' 89
Additionally, examiners may not examine financial

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Id. § 7-1-3(a)(10)(A).
Id. § 7-1-3(a)(10)(B).
Id. § 7-1-3(a)(10)(C).
O.C.G.A. § 7-1-37(a) (1997 & Supp. 2003).
Id.
Id. § 7-1-37(a)(3).
Id. § 7-1-37(e)(1)(A).
Id. § 7-1-37(e)(1XB).

Id.
Id. § 7-1-37(e)(1)(C).
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institutions in which they own securities under (a) and (b) above.1 90
Amendments to this chapter also set forth certain restrictions on giving
and receiving money or property as gifts or loans from licensees unless
certain requirements are met. 191
3. Electronic Collection of Fees by Department. The general
assembly authorized the Department to collect examination, license,
registration, and supervision fees via any manner deemed efficient,
including electronic means.' 92
4. Fulfillment of Vacancies on Supervisory Committee of
Credit Unions. O.C.G.A. section 7-1-656193 assigns the board of
directors of a credit union the duty of filling vacancies9 4on its supervisory
committee until a successor is elected and qualified.
5. Deletion of Concept of "Risk Assets" with Respect to Credit
Unions. The general assembly deleted the definition of "risk assets"
(with respect to the level of capital and reserves required to be held by
credit unions) in its entirety."'
6. Exemption of National Banks and Credit Unions from
Licensing Requirements as Check Cashers. O.C.G.A. section 7-1709(a) 196 as amended exempts national banks, trust companies, credit
unions, building and loan associations, and savings and loan associations
from licensing requirements as check cashers.117
7. Background Checks for Mortgage Business Policymakers
(Directors and Officers). O.C.G.A. section 7-1-1004198 was rewritten to authorize the Department to conduct investigations as it deems
necessary on any individual directing the affairs or establishing the
policy for a licensed mortgage business, including its officers, directors,
or the equivalent, to determine that such people are of good character
and ethical reputation. 9 9 The Department was also given broad
rulemaking authority to establish minimum education or experience
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. § 7-1-37(f).
Id. § 7-1-37(g).
O.C.G.A. § 7-1-41 (1997 & Supp. 2003).
O.C.G.A. § 7-1-656 (1997 & Supp. 2003).
Id. § 7-1-656(a)(5).
O.C.G.A. § 7-1-668 (1997); 1974 Ga. Laws 705.
O.C.G.A. § 7-1-709(a) (1997 & Supp. 2003).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 7-1-1004 (1997 & Supp. 2003).
Id.
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requirements for applicants for mortgage brokers licenses and renewals.200 Additionally, every licensee and applicant is authorized and
required to obtain background checks on its employees.20 '
8. Advertising by Mortgage Lenders. All advertisements of
mortgage lenders in Georgia are now required to contain the license
number of the licensee or registrant. 20 2 Licensees licensed in more
than one state who are advertising in Georgia must include Georgia in
its listing of states in which the advertiser is licensed. 0 3

200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. § 7-1-1004(c).
Id. § 7-1-1004(f).
O.C.G.A. § 7-1-1016(2) (1997 & Supp. 2003).
Id.

